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The Latin American economies face a highly complex outlook as a result of various factors, 
such as the fragility of the recovery in the advanced economies in the wake of the crisis, 
the tensions in re-balancing the Chinese economy and doubts over the extent of the pick-
up in commodities prices. And adding to these has been the change of US Administration, 
with potential global implications owing to the expected change in the US economic 
policy stance. 
Nonetheless, National Accounts data have shown a muted improvement in the region as a 
whole in the second half of 2016, assisted by the firmness of financial markets, the easing in 
monetary policies – against a backdrop of falling inflation – and the turnaround in commodities 
prices. The higher-frequency indicators point to a continuation of this improvement in the 
opening months of 2017. For 2017 as a whole, a moderate pick-up in growth across the 
region is expected, but one that is notably uneven from country to country, and with the 
balance of risks to growth remaining tilted to the downside.
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Although the financial markets have performed favourably over the past six-month period 
and this has, the odd episode of instability apart, been reflected in low levels of volatility, 
global economic developments have been marked by high uncertainty. The result of the 
US election last November, with potentially global implications owing to the expected 
change in economic policy stance, has joined other factors — such as the fragility of the 
recovery in the advanced economies in the wake of the crisis, the tensions in re-balancing 
the Chinese economy and doubts over the extent of the pick-up in commodities prices — 
to shape a highly complex economic outlook for Latin America in the medium term. 
Over a closer horizon, global economic activity, especially in the advanced economies, 
tended to rise in the second half of 2016. In addition, the firmness of financial markets has 
provided for a pick-up in capital flows to the emerging economies (and particularly to Latin 
America) and an increase in bond issuance by these economies. These developments 
have checked the depreciation of their currencies, facilitating a reduction in domestic 
inflation and enabling a change in monetary policy stance, although the cuts in terms of 
real interest rates are still limited. Further, the turnaround in commodities prices in 2016 
has enabled a partial recovery of the terms of trade. 
Unsurprisingly, then, National Accounts data have shown a muted improvement in the 
region as a whole in the second half of the year. GDP growth, for the weighted average of 
the six main economies for which information is available1, has risen from a quarter-on-
quarter rate of -0.2% in the first half of the year to 0.1% in the second half. In year-on-year 
terms, the fall in activity has gradually lost momentum, from -1.0% in Q1 to -0.2% in Q4. 
The improvement has been fairly generalised with the exception of Brazil, whose GDP has 
fallen once again to a rate close to -1% in 2016 Q4. 
The higher-frequency indicators point to a continuation of this improvement in the opening 
months of 2017, although it is still premature to conclude it is firming. The progress of the 
recovery in the short term is being underpinned not only by the aforementioned factors, 
but also by a progressive shift from net external demand to domestic demand, chiefly 
investment, while the increase in uncertainty (which is denting agents’ confidence, 
especially in Mexico), the fiscal adjustments under way and the slackness of credit would 
appear to be counteracting this. In this setting, the consensus macroeconomic forecasts 
for the region’s seven main economies as a whole (including Venezuela) suggest growth of 
1.2% in 2017, following the fall of -0.7% estimated for 2016. In any event, this improvement, 
which has continued to be revised downwards in recent months, largely reflects the 
expected recovery in Brazil and Argentina (see Chart 1). 
The balance of risks to growth remains tilted to the downside. Notable in the external 
domain are the risks arising from a possible abrupt tightening of global financial conditions, 
in the event that the normalisation of interest rates by the Federal Reserve were swifter 
than anticipated or that a change in global financial market sentiment were triggered by 
some other factor (including political events in some advanced economies). Moreover, 
although growth in the Chinese economy has stabilised recently, the widening in some 
imbalances and excessive corporate debt pose risks of a sharp adjustment over a lengthy 
Introduction
1  Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Colombia, Chile and Peru.
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horizon. On the domestic front, fiscal consolidation, the elections scheduled for 2017 and 
cases of corruption in various countries are further factors of uncertainty. 
The first section of this report on the Latin American economy offers an overview of recent 
economic developments in the region. Thereafter, two dedicated sections offer an in-depth 
view of two specific matters. The first matter selected is the potential impact on the 
economies in the region — and in particular on Mexico — of the expected changes in US 
economic policies following Donald Trump’s election as president. The second section 
tackles the recent adjustment in the Chilean economy in the face of a more unfavourable 
external environment and the challenges its economic policy must address. 
The change in economic policy stance announced by the new US Administration, 
potentially with highly significant implications globally, has added a considerable measure 
of uncertainty to the international economic and financial context over the past six months. 
Notwithstanding, international financial markets — including emerging and, in particular, 
Latin American markets — have performed favourably, with low volatility levels, except at 
specific junctures. In parallel, the GDP data for 2016 Q4 highlighted the strengthening of 
activity in the advanced economies (as reflected in the upward revisions to growth 
forecasts for 2017) and in certain emerging economies, mainly in Asia, which was 
conducive to a moderate rise in international trade. Oil prices held stable over the final 
months of the period in question, after having trended upward in the first half of 2016, 
although they slid (by 10%) in the first week of March following the release of higher-than-
expected inventories figures in the United States, having since recovered. 
As from the summer and up to the presidential election in the United States, 
developments on emerging financial markets were characterised by a relatively positive 
firmness, with the odd exception such as Mexico and Turkey. The Republican candidate’s 
unexpected victory unleashed a bout of global turbulence, which led to a heavy 
depreciation of the emerging economies’ currencies, an increase in sovereign yields 
(see Chart 2), capital outflows (for a similar amount to those in May 2013) and the 
grinding to a halt of bond issues. However, as was the case after Brexit in June 2016, 
the duration of the episode was limited, meaning that by mid-December almost all the 
emerging markets regained their previous levels (Chart 2), with the exception of the 
currencies of certain countries more exposed to the new US trade and migration policies 
Recent developments 
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GROWTH PROJECTIONS IN LATIN AMERICA CHART 1
SOURCE: Latin American Consensus Forecasts.
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SOURCES: Datastream and JP Morgan.
a Latin American, Asian and Eastern European rates have been constructed by adding the US 10-year government bond yield and EMBI spreads
b MSCI Latin America index in local currency.
c Global GPU index.
d Simple average of EIU political risk indicators of 27 emerging economies.
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(such as Mexico) and of some economies more dependent on external funding and 
subject to idiosyncratic geopolitical risks (Turkey). 
The sound performance of the financial markets has stepped up in early 2017, in line 
with what was seen in other high-risk segments (see Chart 2). As a result, by late March, 
emerging stock markets stood 10% above their November 2016 level and their sovereign 
spreads were close to 40 bp down (having been at a low since May 2014). Moreover, in 
2017 Q1 there were both debt- and equity-based capital inflows (essentially on the 
Asian markets), which virtually offset the outflows recorded in November last year 
(Chart 3).  Finally, from January to March 2017, bond issues on international markets 
totalled $152 billion, a new historical high for a first quarter, thanks to sovereign 
placements, some of them by countries with a low credit rating. There are several 
reasons for this behaviour: the relative stability of oil prices at levels double those in 
early 2016; the rise in the price of metals to highs since mid-2014; and a search for yield 
against a background of still-very-low interest rates globally. Nonetheless, the situation 
is not free from risks, given that the vulnerabilities in the emerging economies have not 
diminished, and a decoupling is apparent between the risk premium of the emerging 
countries and the indicators of global uncertainty (which are at historical highs) and of 
idiosyncratic political risk (see Chart 2). 
The Latin American financial markets were similarly affected by these trends. The positive 
tone prevailed until the US election, with the exception of Mexico, whose markets 
evidenced high volatility from mid-2016, stemming from the uncertainty over the electoral 
result and from the collapse of oil prices and its attendant effect on the financial position 
of PEMEX. Trump’s victory prompted a temporary downturn in Latin American markets, 
acutely so in Mexico, where the peso depreciated by 11% in four days (see Chart 2), 
reaching an historical low on 19 January, and stock markets, CDS, the sovereign spread 
and long-term rates in local currency performed much more adversely than in the 
emerging economies. 
As from December, the Latin American financial indicators have recovered and the 
indicators of financial stress, which had risen in the final stretch of 2016, have fallen once 
more since early 2017, reaching levels in some cases close to historical lows (see Chart 2). 
Since the beginning of this year, Latin American stock markets have risen 11.3%, notably 
so in Chile (12.4%) and Brazil (4.3%), on one hand, and in the case of the non-energy 
commodities companies (17.5%), on the other. Sovereign spreads have narrowed by close 
to 40 bp, somewhat more than in the emerging economies as a whole, owing to the marked 
declines in Peru, Chile and Brazil (60 bp; see Chart 2). Finally, Latin American currencies 
have appreciated since the start of the year by between 3% and 5%. The exception was 
once again the Mexican peso, which has appreciated by 19% since mid-January, 
underpinned by the measures adopted by the Mexican central bank, which has raised its 
policy rates on three consecutive occasions, intervened on foreign exchange markets and 
set in train a programme of foreign exchange hedges2; the new US Administration’s lesser 
emphasis on protectionist talk has also helped the peso.
2  Foreign exchange swaps would be settled in national currency, meaning they should not affect reserves, and 
placed in weekly tenders of $1 billion each, distributed in terms of one, two, three, six, nine and 12 months, for 
a total maximum amount of $20 billion. The first swaps tender was held on 6 March, and there was greater 
demand for the shorter-dated terms, awarded at an exchange rate 0.1% up on the previous day’s close. The 
one-year hedge was assigned as an exchange rate 4.3% down, but at a distance from the historical low of 19 
January. These instruments were used by Brazil in 2002 and 2014, for a much greater amount (a maximum of 
$116 billion, $28 billion at present) and with a relatively high fiscal cost.
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As discussed, following the decline in capital flows to the Latin American economies in the 
wake of Donald Trump’s election, direct investment inflows rose substantially in late 2016, 
ending the quarter $4.8 billion up on the same quarter in 2015 (see Chart 3). Country by 
country, the increase in inflows into Brazil ($6.1 billion, especially in the services sector, 
and, thereunder, in distributive trade and financial activities) offset the decline observed in 
Mexico (-$1.5 billion, due to construction and services). Portfolio inflows stabilised in 2016 
Q4 at levels close to the historical average ($9 billion), with a change in the geographical 
make-up, since in this case Brazil recorded capital outflows in the four quarters of the year 
(with the unwinding of non-residents’ positions in the local debt markets) while in Mexico 
portfolio inflows picked up, initially owing to those targeted on money markets and 
subsequently to the increase in public-sector debt. Likewise, Argentina led bond issues in 
the region during the period analysed (see Chart 3), along with the state-owned oil 
corporations of Brazil and Mexico, meaning that 2016 marked a new all-time high in 
placements ($140 billion). Financial conditions scarcely changed in the period analysed, 
while euro-denominated placements fell to 12% of the total (17% in 2015). In 2017 Q1, 
placements totalled $41.5 billion, in a market dominated once more by sovereign issues 
(52% of the total). 
In the second half of 2016 all the region’s countries, except Brazil and Venezuela, posted 
higher quarter-on-quarter GDP growth rates than in the first half of the year, marking what 
might prove a turning point from the previous trend. Year-on-year rates, however, were 
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worse owing to the knock-on effect of the previous quarters, with the exception of Brazil, 
whose GDP improved from a year-on-year rate of -4.5% in the first half of the year to 
-2.7% in the second half, owing to the fact that the second half of 2015 had been 
particularly adverse. Among the other countries, the downturn in year-on-year growth 
rates was most significant in Argentina (falling from a rate of -1.5% to -2.9%), Colombia 
(whose growth dipped from 2.5% to 1.4%) and Chile (from 2.1% to 1.1%); Mexico (from 
2.4% to 2.2%) and Peru (from 4.1% to 3.7%) decelerated only slightly. Overall, GDP for 
the aggregate of Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Colombia, Chile and Peru turned up from 
-0.8% year-on-year in the first half to -0.4% in the second (see Table 1 and Chart 4). 
Activity in Brazil in Q4 was disappointing. GDP contracted 0.9% in quarter-on-quarter 
terms, the worst figure in 2016 and the eighth consecutive quarter of declining activity. The 
contraction in Q4 was due to the poor export performance, especially in primary products 
(which fell by 20.5%), and to the sluggishness of domestic consumption and investment. 
In 2016 as a whole, GDP fell by 3.6%, very close to the negative decline of 3.8% the 
previous year. 
Conversely, and despite negative year-on-year rates, Argentina emerged from recession in 
Q3, with quarter-on-quarter growth of 0.1%, which rose to 0.5% in Q4. Colombia posted 
its lowest year-on-year growth for 2016 in Q3, owing in part to a transport strike in July and 
August, and a substantial improvement was observed in Q4. In Chile, GDP fell in quarter-
on-quarter terms (-0.4%) in Q4, owing to a strong fall-off in investment and in government 
consumption, after posting positive growth in Q3. 
The quarter-on-quarter growth figures in Mexico and Peru were robust in the second half 
of the year. In Mexico’s case, activity was sustained thanks to the sound performance of 
private consumption, with the data so far failing to reflect the possible negative impact of 
the change in the new US Administration’s trade and migration policies. In Peru, activity 
was underpinned by the contribution of external demand, owing chiefly to the increase in 
exports, against a background of sharply declining government consumption. 
At the aggregate level, the positive contribution of external demand to regional growth in 
2016 was notable, as opposed to the sluggishness of domestic demand. Both investment 
and private consumption fell in the region as a whole, although the course of both 
components improved in the second half of the year and, above all, in Q4. The 
sluggishness of private consumption was accompanied by higher unemployment rates 
(see Chart 5) in all countries in the region, with the exception of Mexico, which explains 
the strength of its consumption. 
Turning to the external imbalance, the Latin American countries corrected their current 
account deficit in 2016. The biggest adjustments were in Brazil, where the deficit shrank 
from 3.3% to 1.3% of GDP, in Colombia (from 6.4% to 4.4% of GDP) and in Peru (from 
4.9% to 2.8% of GDP). Mexico (from 2.9% to 2.6% of GDP) and Chile (from 1.9% to 1.5% 
of GDP) also reduced their current account deficit, albeit to a lesser extent. These 
adjustments broadly reflected higher exports, in particular in those countries whose terms 
of trade improved owing to the pick-up in their export prices, assisted in some cases by 
the depreciation of their currencies against the dollar. Furthermore, the weakness of 
domestic demand also contributed to tempering significantly the buoyancy of imports. 
The most recently updated indicators and the short-term forecasting models point to a 
favourable outlook in 2017 Q1 in Mexico, despite the uncertainty generated by the new US 
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SOURCE: National statistics.
a Latin America-6: all the countries represented, except Venezuela. Latin America-5: all the countries represented, except Argentina and Venezuela
b Seasonally adjusted.
c Four-quarter moving average.
2017
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 March
GDP (year-on-year rate)
    Latin America 6 (a) 0.0 -0.6 0.5 0.4 -0.1 -0.7 -1.0 -0.7 -0.5 -0.2
    Argentina 2.7 -2.3 0.0 3.9 3.8 2.7 0.6 -3.7 -3.7 -2.1
    Brazil -3.8 -3.6 -1.8 -3.0 -4.5 -5.8 -5.4 -3.6 -2.9 -2.5
    Mexico 2.6 2.3 2.8 2.5 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.6 2.1 2.4
    Chile 2.3 1.6 2.6 2.1 2.4 1.9 2.5 1.7 1.8 0.5
    Colombia (b) 3.1 2.0 2.6 3.0 3.2 3.4 2.6 2.4 1.2 1.6
    Venezuela — — -1.4 -4.7 -7.1 — — — — —
    Peru 3.3 3.9 1.9 3.2 3.3 4.8 4.4 3.8 4.5 3.0
CPI (year-on-year rate)
    Latin America 5 (a) 6.1 6.1 5.4 5.8 6.2 6.6 6.8 6.3 6.0 5.2 4.7
    Brazil 9.0 8.7 7.7 8.5 9.5 10.4 10.1 9.1 8.7 7.0 4.6
    Mexico 2.7 2.8 3.1 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.7 2.6 2.8 3.2 5.4
    Chile 4.3 3.8 4.4 4.2 4.8 4.1 4.6 4.2 3.5 2.8 2.7
    Colombia 5.0 7.5 4.2 4.5 4.9 6.4 7.7 8.2 8.1 6.1 4.7
    Venezuela 121.7 — 79.5 89.7 126.5 170.1 — — — — —
    Peru 3.5 3.6 3.0 3.3 3.8 4.1 4.5 3.6 3.0 3.3 4.0
Budget balance (% of GDP) (c)
    Latin America 6 (a) -5.7 -4.9 -4.5 -4.7 -5.1 -5.7 -5.1 -4.9 -4.8 -4.9
    Argentina -3.9 -4.5 -3.1 -3.5 -3.6 -3.9 -3.2 -3.6 -3.6 -4.5
    Brazil -9.1 -7.6 -6.7 -7.0 -8.0 -9.1 -8.3 -8.4 -7.9 -7.6
    Mexico -3.4 -2.6 -3.3 -3.7 -3.3 -3.4 -3.1 -2.1 -2.2 -2.6
    Chile -2.2 -2.7 -1.8 -2.0 -2.1 -2.2 -1.7 -1.8 -2.5 -2.7
    Colombia -3.1 -3.8 -3.0 -2.5 -2.8 -3.1 -3.1 -3.2 -3.9 -3.8
    Peru -2.9 -2.6 -1.0 -1.5 -2.1 -2.9 -3.2 -3.2 -3.2 -2.6
Public debt (% of GDP)
    Latin America 6 (a) 50.2 — 46.8 47.5 49.2 49.7 51.1 51.9 53.4 —
    Argentina 35.3 — 38.1 38.0 38.7 35.3 38.8 41.8 44.7 —
    Brazil 65.5 69.6 59.5 60.7 63.6 65.5 66.3 67.5 69.9 69.6
    Mexico 46.2 50.9 43.5 43.9 45.6 46.2 48.0 48.1 49.3 50.9
    Chile 17.5 21.1 15.7 16.3 16.9 17.5 18.7 19.1 20.2 21.1
    Colombia 41.4 42.5 39.7 40.3 43.1 41.4 42.3 41.7 41.8 42.5
    Peru 23.3 23.8 19.9 19.9 21.1 23.3 22.8 22.2 22.7 23.8
Current account balance (% of GDP) (c)
    Latin America-6 (a) -3.3 -3.3 -3.5 -3.4 -3.0 -2.8 -2.5 -2.2
    Argentina -2.7 -2.8 -1.3 -1.8 -2.2 -2.7 -2.7 -2.9 -2.8 -2.8
    Brazil -3.3 -1.3 -4.3 -4.2 -4.0 -3.3 -2.5 -1.8 -1.4 -1.3
    Mexico -2.9 -2.7 -2.1 -2.1 -2.6 -2.9 -3.0 -3.0 -3.0 -2.7
    Chile -1.9 -1.4 -1.1 -1.1 -1.6 -1.9 -2.0 -2.2 -1.9 -1.4
    Colombia -6.4 -4.4 -5.7 -6.0 -6.7 -6.4 -6.1 -5.7 -5.1 -4.4
    Venezuela — — -1.2 -1.7 -2.1 — — — — —
    Peru -4.9 -2.8 -4.6 -4.3 -4.8 -4.9 -4.6 -4.4 -3.7 -2.8
External debt (% of GDP)
    Latin America 6 (a) 34.4 — 29.1 30.9 32.2 34.1 37.0 38.6 37.9 —
    Argentina 27.0 35.3 28.5 28.7 28.3 27.0 29.5 31.7 33.6 35.3
    Brazil 37.0 37.3 29.4 32.1 33.3 36.5 39.8 41.9 40.0 37.1
    Mexico 25.9 29.9 22.5 23.7 24.9 25.9 28.5 29.6 29.8 29.9
    Chile 64.2 — 57.8 59.2 62.8 64.1 66.8 68.4 67.4 —
    Colombia 37.9 42.5 29.2 31.2 34.7 37.8 40.9 42.7 42.0 42.3
    Venezuela — — 18.1 15.1 13.2 — — — — —
    Peru 38.1 38.2 34.8 34.7 37.0 38.1 39.5 39.1 39.0 38.2
2015 2016
61025102
TABLE 1LATIN AMERICA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS
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Administration’s policies. Foreseeably, the depreciation of the Mexican peso will help 
stabilise the level of activity in the face of external shocks. In Brazil, the strong decline in 
GDP in 2016 Q4 was a negative surprise, which worsens growth expectations in early 
2017. In Argentina, the indicators suggest that the exit from recession will firm and growth 
expectations are favourable. For Colombia and Chile there are signs of a higher level of 
activity in Q1, although in Chile the mining strikes might subtract several basis points from 
growth in this quarter. In Peru, expectations are favourable, although the cancellation of 
infrastructure projects and the consequences of the heavy rainfall in March because of the 
“Niño Costero” weather phenomenon may have a bearing on output. 
Inflation developments in the region in the past six months have been characterised, with 
the odd exception, by a downward trend, although the pace of decline has differed notably 
from country to country. Average inflation in the five countries with inflation targeting 
regimes stood at 4.7% year-on-year in March, 1.4 pp less than in June last year, with a 
discernible narrowing of the differences across the countries (see Chart 6). The fall in 
inflation has been mainly due to the stabilisation of exchange rates following the heavy 
previous depreciations, to the sluggishness of demand and, in Brazil, to the path of 
regulated prices. The decline has been particularly sharp in Brazil and Colombia, where 
rates of 4.6% and 4.7% were recorded in March, respectively. In Peru and Chile inflation 
INFLATION AND ECONOMIC 
POLICIES 
SOURCES: Datastream and national statistics.
a Dots represent March 2017 forecast of the Latin American Consensus Forecasts for 2017 and 2018.
b Mexico, Chile, Colombia and Peru.
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stood at 4% and 2.7%, respectively. Conversely, inflation rose significantly in Mexico, 
owing to the continuing effect of the depreciation and to the increase in petrol prices, 
partly associated with tax changes. In Argentina, the new official price index, which was 
first released in June 2016, increased on average by 1.5% per month in the second half of 
the year, so inflation fell yet again, albeit at a lower-than-expected pace. 
As a result, monetary policies have progressively shifted to an easier stance, with the 
principal exception of Mexico. In Brazil, coinciding with the approval of the constitutional 
amendment to limit public spending growth, a cycle of cuts to the policy interest rate 
was launched, which began at the October meeting and which, so far, has entailed a 300 
bp reduction (25 bp at the October and December meetings, 75 bp at those in January 
and February, and 100 bp in April) to 11.25% (see Chart 6). The market discounts further 
cuts insofar as inflation, which is now within its target range, continues to decline (see 
Table 2). The Colombian central bank lowered its policy interest rate by 25 bp at three of 
its four latest monetary policy meetings, placing it at 7%, against a background of weak 
demand and lower inflation, which is still above the upper threshold of its target band. 
Likewise, the Chilean central bank cut its official rate by 25 bp on three separate 
occasions, leaving it at 2.75%. In Chile, Colombia and Peru, where the central bank has 
not altered its policy interest rate since February 2016, further monetary easing is 
expected over the course of 2017. 
SOURCE: Datastream.
a Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.
b Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru.
c Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru.
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The situation in Mexico is radically different from that of the foregoing countries; 
following the pre-emptive tightening of monetary policy begun last June in the face of 
the sharp depreciation of the Mexican peso, the failure to correct the current deficit and 
the perception of a greater risk associated with the outcome of the US presidential 
election, the central bank decided on three further hikes of 50 bp and one of 25 bp in its 
policy rate over the last six months, placing it at 6.50%, in order to prevent second-
round effects stemming from the depreciation of the peso and the hike in petrol prices. 
In Argentina, the pace of easing of monetary policy has slowed significantly in the 
second half of the year, given the downward stickiness of the rate of price rises and the 
difficulty in placing inflation in the central bank’s target range (between 12% and 17% 
for 2017). Hence, after cutting the official interest rate by 200 bp between September 
2016 and March 2017, the central bank raised it in April by 150 bp to 26.25%. 
In the fiscal policy realm, and in line with previous years, both cyclical weakness and the 
choice of gradual fiscal consolidation strategies have limited progress in ongoing 
consolidation and the correction of fiscal balances has been modest (see Chart 7). 
Moreover, in certain cases, consolidation has been based on temporary measures, such 
as tax amnesties. In any event, it should be stressed that most countries have attained 
the (not always ambitious) fiscal targets set in the budgetary plans. Further, in some 
cases legislative reform has been introduced to contribute to fiscal sustainability in the 
SOURCES: Datastream.
a Aggregate of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.
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medium term. An increase in or stabilisation of commodities prices, where appropriate, 
has — given that they are a significant source of public revenue– also helped alleviate 
public finances. 
In Brazil, the constitutional amendment capping nominal public spending to the previous 
year’s inflation over the next 20 years was finally approved in December. Moreover, the 
reform of pensions is in passage through Parliament, the approval of which is expected in 
the course of 2017. Given the medium and long-term public-spending-reduction drive to 
tackle the country’s serious fiscal crisis, the Government appointed in May 2016 has opted 
for a gradual fiscal consolidation strategy in the short term. So far, in 2016 the primary 
deficit hit the target set by the Government (2.5% of GDP), underpinned by the extraordinary 
increase in revenue arising from the tax amnesty and by the slowdown in nominal spending 
at the end of the year. Although the deficit is expected to stabilise in the course of 2017 (on 
monthly information, it is estimated to have already fallen from 10% in June 2016 to 8.7% 
in January), the stock of debt will continue growing in the coming years. In Argentina, 
which has also opted for a gradualist strategy, headway in consolidation has been limited. 
The primary deficit stood at 4.6% of GDP in 2016, 0.2 pp below the Government’s target, 
although without the revenue arising from the tax amnesty it would have stood at 6%. The 
gradual adjustment is forecast to continue in 2017 and the deficit target has been set at 
4.2%. In Mexico, the fiscal adjustment remained under way, with the primary balance in 
2016 standing at -0.2% of GDP, around 1 pp below the figure recorded in 2015. For 2017, 
the Government has set a primary surplus of 0.4% as a target. 
In Colombia, the Parliament approved a tax reform in December which raised the VAT rate 
from 16% to 19%, introduced a so-called “monotributo” (single tax) for individuals, 
lowered corporate income tax and entrenched more firmly the financial movements levy 
which it had introduced previously on a temporary basis. It is estimated this reform will 
raise tax takings by between 0.7% of GDP, in 2017, and 1.8 %, in 2022. Notwithstanding, 
the budget deficit rose by somewhat more than 0.5 pp, ending 2016 at 4%, chiefly owing 
to the decline in oil-related revenue. The end-2016 fiscal outcome in Chile, with a total 
deficit of 2.8% of GDP and a structural deficit of 1.6%, was better than expected. Finally, 
in Peru, the information available for 2016 suggests that the fiscal deficit will be below the 
Government target (3%); it is expected to improve this figure in 2017 with the introduction 
of a tax amnesty (in force during 2017) to declare assets abroad. 
The outlook for the region points to a moderate recovery in growth (which, on consensus 
forecasts, would stand at 1.2% in 2017, following the 2016 figure of -0.7%), with marked 
OUTLOOK 
SOURCES: National statistics and Consensus Forecasts.
a March 2017 Consensus Forecast for the end of the year.
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heterogeneity across the different countries (see Chart 1). In particular, the expected 
slowdown in activity in Mexico (whose growth would fall to 1.4% in 2017 from 2.3% last 
year), where a certain negative impact of the change in US economic policies is 
discounted, contrasts with the improvement projected for the South American countries. 
In this region, positive growth is expected in Brazil and Argentina (0.5% and 3.0%, 
respectively), following the declines in activity in 2016; in Colombia, Peru and, to a 
lesser extent, Chile, a gradual strengthening in activity is foreseen; and, in Venezuela, 
the recession will continue against a backdrop of deep-seated social and institutional 
crisis. As regards inflation, it is generally envisaged that there will be successful 
convergence on target ranges, although in Mexico’s case, the return to the reference 
range may be delayed until the effects of the heavy depreciation and the rise in petrol 
prices have abated. 
The balance of risks to growth remains tilted to the downside. Most notable on the 
external front are the swifter-than-expected tightening of US monetary policy, changes 
in investor sentiment in the current environment of high uncertainty, and difficulties in 
seeing through economic re-balancing in China. Domestically, the main risks are 
associated with the potential need to accelerate the pace of fiscal consolidation, with 
the uncertainty surrounding the scheduled elections and with the trying of certain cases 
of corruption. 
SOURCES: Datastream.
a Aggregate of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.
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Based on the announcements made during the electoral campaign, Donald Trump’s victory 
in the US presidential election last November may entail a substantial change in the US 
economic policy stance. The measures announced, if implemented, would have global 
consequences. Among the economies potentially most exposed to the shift are many in 
Latin America, which has significant trade, financial and migratory ties with the United 
States, turning in many cases on geographical proximity. Admittedly, there is still enormous 
uncertainty over the extent and depth with which the new president will put into practice 
the contents of this electoral programme, given the divisions in his party over some of the 
proposals. This section offers a review of the main measures under discussion and of the 
potential impact of some of them on the Latin American economies and, principally, on 
Mexico, which has closer ties. 
As regards international trade, the new Administration has begun by abandoning the 
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPP) and has initiated talks with 
Mexico and Canada to amend the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
Furthermore, it has considered imposing tariffs on Chinese and Mexican imports (electoral 
proposals placed them at 45% and 35%, respectively) and the possibility of introducing a 
corporation tax that includes an at-border adjustment mechanism that penalises imports 
and exempts exports from the tax. 
On migratory policy, several measures announced point to greater restrictions on incoming 
immigrants: the new president has already signed various executive decrees requesting 
funds for the construction of a wall on the border with Mexico (perhaps the best-known 
proposal of his electoral programme), the immediate expulsion of persons in an illegal 
situation and curbs on the entry of refugees and citizens from certain Muslim countries, 
although this latter measure has been suspended under a legal ruling. In the fiscal arena, 
a wide range of measures are at different stages of discussion, including most notably an 
aggressive reform of corporate income tax (including, among other things, a significant 
reduction in the tax rate), a cut in personal income tax (more pronounced for the higher 
bases), an infrastructure plan, an increase in defence spending and the possibility of 
compensatory cuts in other expenditure items. The expansionary nature of these fiscal 
measures, along with the fact that the output gap has already practically closed, potentially 
paves the way for the Federal Reserve to normalise its monetary policy stance more swiftly 
than announced. Indeed, recent months have seen the discounting of the policy interest 
rate rises expected by the markets, associated in part with the expected shift in the fiscal 
policy stance. Finally, with regard to financial regulation, there is the stated intention to 
repeal certain sections of the Dodd-Frank Act and a lesser willingness to coordinate 
regulation at the international level. 
The lack of specifics offered for most of the measures mentioned hampers any rigorous 
assessment of their implications. This section selects some of the measures which, a 
priori, appear to be more likely to be implemented, and simulates their impact on the Latin 
American economies, conditional upon a certain specification of such measures. 
In the trade domain, the United States has maintained very close links to some Latin 
American economies (Mexico and Cuba, for instance) since the late 19th century. These 
ties were extended to other countries in the region, markedly so during the two decades 
prior to the global financial crisis. As a result, the integration of these economies, especially 
Mexico and Colombia, into the US value chain reached particularly significant levels in this 
period (see Chart 8). After the financial crisis, the sectors and states with the greatest 
presence in these international value chains were those most affected by the recession, 
The possible impact on 
Latin America of the 
expected changes in US 
economic policy
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but they also recovered more robustly afterwards. In this respect, recent studies3 offer 
evidence that the increase in the global intensity of trade during the 2000-2008 period was 
due to a combination of two forces: the greater demand for goods with a high import 
content (consumer durables and equipment) and the continuous fragmentation of 
production at the international level. Since 2011, the fragmentation process has come to a 
halt and the demand for services (less trade-intensive than goods) has increased in relative 
terms, leading to less trade intensity. 
The significance of regional value chains between the United States and Latin America 
can be analysed by calculating the share of value added originating in one region (United 
States or Latin America) in the exports of the other region. As can be seen in Chart 9, 
which breaks down the share of Latin America in global value chains by region and sector, 
this share is relatively high on average, but markedly uneven across countries and sectors; 
indeed, it is highly polarised. On one hand, exports from Mexico and Costa Rica 
incorporate most intensely value added generated in the United States, particularly in 
products of medium and high-technology sectors. On the other, the value-added provided 
from Latin America to US exports originates to a greater extent in Mexico and Colombia, 
in their capacity as suppliers of raw materials and services, respectively. These results 
SOURCES: World Integrated Trade Statistics, BIS, IMF and World Bank.
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underscore the high integration of Mexico and the United States in the production chains 
of numerous sectors.4
During his campaign, President Donald Trump announced his intention, if elected, to 
place restrictions on trade with the rest of the world, chiefly the countries with which the 
United States runs a trade deficit. The results of certain simulations conducted to 
quantify the possible impact of this type of measure5 show that, under the scenario of 
a 35% increase in tariffs on goods imported from Mexico (and 45% in the case of 
China), in line with Trump’s statements in the electoral campaign, and considering 
retaliation on a similar scale by both countries,6 the impact on activity in Mexico would 
be most adverse, resulting in a cumulative reduction in growth of around 6 pp in the 
2017-2020 period. Under an alternative scenario, encompassing a generalised rise in 
tariffs, placing them at the levels prevailing in the 1990s, the effect on the world economy 
would be most marked, resulting in a reduction in cumulative world growth of around 1 
pp in the 2017-2020 period. 
4  For example, according to data from the United States Trade Office, the states of Michigan and California 
accounted for around 87% of the trade deficit with Mexico in 2015 ($58 billion), since US imports of vehicles and 
car components from Mexico contain a significant proportion of inputs from the United States. 
5  See the recent analytical article of the Banco de España, “Situation of and outlook for the world economy at the 
start of 2017” pp. 19-20. Available at: http://www.bde.es/bde/es/secciones/informes/ 
6  It should be stressed that these simulations omitted certain channels associated with a tariff shock.
SOURCE: OECD (Trade in Value Added and TiVA Database.
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To assess the effects of a more expansionary US fiscal policy on the Latin American 
economies, a series of simulations have been made with the Oxford Economics global 
macroeconomic model envisaging a fiscal scenario that is detailed in Table 3. What is 
involved is a “moderate” fiscal scenario, in line with the implementation of measures that 
the consensus among analysts considers to be most likely, and which is approximately 
equivalent to half of the amounts mentioned in the campaign by the new president; 
moreover, the scenario does not envisage the Republicans’ proposal to introduce into 
corporate income tax an at-border adjustment mechanism that penalises imports and 
exempts exports from tax.7 Specifically, the simulation incorporates the following elements: 
(i) a reduction in the corporate income tax rate; (ii) a reduction in personal income tax; and 
(iii) an infrastructure plan on a scale close to 0.3% of GDP per annum for the duration of 
the legislature. The simulation incorporates a monetary policy reaction to the fiscal 
expansion described, since inflation would climb, giving rise to a less gradual monetary 
normalisation path, around 300-400 bp above the baseline scenario. 
Chart 10 shows that the fiscal scenario considered would have a positive effect on the 
level of activity in Mexico. Specifically, growth of the Mexican economy would exceed 
baseline scenario growth by 0.3 pp on average until early 2020. This increase would be 
driven by higher business investment, private consumption and exports; however, the 
current account deficit would increase due to higher imports. Demand pressures would 
generate higher consumer price inflation, which would be nearly 0.3 pp above that of the 
baseline scenario despite the aggressive monetary policy response, which would raise 
interest rates above that of the baseline scenario in a range between 0.25 pp and 0.75 pp. 
The budget deficit would also deteriorate, by nearly 0.3 pp of GDP in 2020. Regarding the 
effects of this fiscal scenario on the other Latin American countries (see Table 4), despite 
the positive initial impact, the medium-term impact would be negative, particularly for 
Argentina and Brazil, mainly due to the tightening of the Federal Reserve’s official rate.8
A portion of the rise in long-term interest rates in the United States seems to be due to 
market participants’ expectations of a fiscal package like that mentioned above. Despite 
this, the term premium continues to stand at historically low levels. There is a possibility 
that other policies of the new Administration may raise the risk premium to more normal 
values, additionally pushing up long-term interest rates. In a setting of highly integrated 
7  See Box 2 “The United States corporate income tax reform plan” of the Quarterly Report on the Spanish 
Economy, March 2017.
8  The results of these simulation exercises must be viewed with caution, since various factors could limit the size 
of the fiscal multipliers provided by the model. 
SOURCE: Banco de España derived from the Oxford Economics global macroeconomic model.
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SOURCE: Banco de España derived from the Oxford Economics global macroeconomic model.
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global financial markets in which the United States continues to be the largest world 
source and destination of foreign direct investment (FDI) flows and the source of sizeable 
portfolio and remittance flows, the main interest rates in the United States can flow through 
to the rest of the world and, even more so, to Latin American countries, particularly Mexico 
(see Chart 8). In the period 2010-2014, 40% of FDI inflows, 50% of portfolio flows and 
practically all remittance inflows (under particular scrutiny by the new Administration) in 
Mexico came from the United States. In the case of Chile, the percentage of FDI inflows 
and portfolio inflows coming from the United States was around 30% and 50%, respectively, 
of the total. To quantify the possible impact of shocks of this type, we simulated a 100 bp 
rise in term premia in the United States and in Latin America up to end-2020, for which we 
again used the Oxford Economics economic model. 
Chart 10 shows that this scenario of higher term premia would have a slightly negative 
effect on Mexican production in the short term, since the potential depreciation of the peso 
would not offset the contraction in demand and the impact of higher borrowing costs on 
public finances. The impact on the GDP growth of the other Latin American countries 
would generally be slightly negative, being more marked in countries like Chile which are 
more dependent on portfolio flows from the United States (see Table 4).
Lastly, it should be noted that US immigration policies will foreseeably be reoriented to 
combine constraints on immigration with the expulsion of illegal immigrants. These 
measures would particularly affect Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean. In fact, 
according to World Bank statistics, in 2010 Mexican immigrants represented 29% of total 
immigrants in the United States and 9.8% of the population of Mexico, well above the 
figures for the other South American countries (see Chart 8). The possible reduction of 
emigration may have a positive effect on the working-age population and human capital of 
emigrant countries, although it would also negatively affect the receipt of remittances, 
which are usually a more stable source of funds than FDI or portfolio investment9. 
SOURCE: Banco de España derived from the Oxford Economics global macroeconomic model.
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9  See Banco de España (2017): “Situation of and outlook for the world economy at the start of 2017”, Banco de 
España, Economic Bulletin, March.
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In short, the results of the simulation exercises suggest (although with the necessary 
cautions given the high uncertainty surrounding the measures and assumptions used in 
the analysis) that the change in the US economic policy scenario may have a significant 
potential impact on the region, particularly on Mexico. Although the expected fiscal 
stimulus may temporarily have a positive effect on the region’s growth, the measures being 
considered by the new US Administration would foreseeably have a negative impact: at 
short term, owing to tighter financing conditions derived from a higher term premium due 
to fiscal expansion against a background of high public debt, but above all owing to 
increased trade protectionism and constraints on migrant flows, which would foreseeably 
have more lasting effects.
Since 2013 the Chilean economy has lost considerable momentum, mainly been due to 
the decline in terms of trade resulting from lower commodity prices and less buoyant 
external demand. These developments have particularly impacted the mining sector, vital 
for the Chilean economy because of the income it generates and the share of aggregate 
investment it represents. Meanwhile, the smaller increase in working-age population and 
the scant headway in productivity led to a downward revision of the growth capacity of the 
economy in the medium term. The economy was obliged to adapt to the new circumstances, 
and, although this was done without major disruptions, it has given rise to a situation of 
higher vulnerability, particularly in the fiscal arena. This section reviews the Chilean 
economic situation in this new setting and assesses the room for manoeuvre which 
economic policies have for addressing this situation.
The past decade was a boom period for the Chilean economy which allowed it to maintain 
twin (fiscal and external) surpluses, accumulate external assets in its sovereign funds and 
use macroeconomic policies countercyclically following the 2008 financial crisis. However, 
from 2011 Chile has been affected by the fall in the price of copper (down more than 50% 
between 2011 Q3 and 2016 Q1) and by the weaker external demand, basically from China, 
its main trading partner. This situation induced a contraction in aggregate demand and a 
loss of buoyancy in the economy. The mining sector grew much more slowly and even 
contracted in 2015 and 2016, as can be seen in Chart 11. Hence GDP growth fell from 6% 
in 2012 to an average of 2% in the four years from 2014 to 2017 (forecast), a poor 
performance unprecedented in the Chilean economy in the last 30 years. The main variable 
affected in this change of cycle was investment, which fell by 18% in real terms between 
2012 and 2016, its share of GDP being reduced to 22% in 2016, down 5 pp from 2012. 
Although the economy’s structural resilience allowed non-financial corporations to maintain 
their access to credit, activity in some sectors, such as construction, was also affected.
The lower capital accumulation, taken in conjunction with factors of a structural nature, 
such as slower growth of the working-age population and stagnation of factor productivity 
in the past decade, meant that potential growth was notably below that estimated before 
the crisis. Thus the trend GDP advisory committee10 estimated the economy’s potential 
growth to be 3%, down 2 pp from 2012 and 0.1 pp higher than the IMF estimate.
The change of cycle was rapidly reflected in the currency market. The copper price slump 
and the change in the financing conditions of the emerging economies — following the 
signs in mid-2013 that the Federal Reserve was beginning to consider reducing the 
The recent adjustment of 
the Chilean economy and 
the current economic 
policy challenges 
10  The structural fiscal balance policy of Chile requires an estimate of the economy’s long-term revenue. For this 
purpose, in 2001 and 2002 two committees were set up which meet yearly to calculate the system’s main 
parameters: the potential GDP of the economy and the long-term copper price.
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monthly volume of its asset purchases — led to a sharp depreciation of the peso, so the 
exchange rate acted as a variable in adjustment to the external shock. The competitiveness 
gains enabled Chile to maintain its exports against an unfavourable external backdrop and 
to replace a part of its imports by domestic production, as shown by Chart 11. As a result, 
the current account balance, which deteriorated notably in 2012 and 2013 to a deficit of 
3.7% of GDP, recovered quickly and ended 2016 with a deficit of 1.4%.
The unfavourable external situation meant that the process of reform undertaken by the 
new government, which took office in 2014, commenced at a particularly delicate time 
from an economic standpoint. The objective was to address some of the main structural 
challenges to the Chilean economy, such as improving educational performance, in order 
to make the transition to more sustainable and all-inclusive economic growth. Although 
the main reforms (educational, fiscal and labour) were approved, their discussion and 
implementation led to heightened economic uncertainty reflected in a fall in private sector 
confidence indicators, as shown in Chart 11. This development impinged on the already-
low investment rates, affecting growth negatively. By contrast, the favourable effects on 
growth of these reforms will become perceptible at medium term, when their ability to 
reduce the traditional bottlenecks in the Chilean economy becomes manifest.
Recently, activity has continued on a slowly advancing path, with growth of 1.6% in 
2016. Against a background of falling investment, the key factor for growth has been 
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domestic consumption, driven by a rise in real wages and a favourable labour market 
performance. However, signs of exhaustion have been observed also on this front, such 
as the increase in unemployment to 7% in the first half of 2016 which, although it 
reversed in the second half of the year, did so with a significant contribution from self-
employment. 
In this setting, fiscal policy has been the main countercyclical tool used by the authorities 
and, as a consequence, the budget deficit increased to 2.8% of GDP in 2016. The net debt 
also increased and, although the figure still stands at a relatively low level, the public 
sector went from being a net international creditor to a net international debtor in 2016. 
Various sovereign debt rating agencies have assessed the Chilean sovereign debt outlook 
as negative for this reason, although the market risk indicators have performed favourably. 
In this situation, the government now envisages a fiscal consolidation plan to reduce the 
structural deficit by 0.25 pp each year. 
Turning to prices, Chart 12 shows that the exchange rate depreciation induced an upturn 
in 2014 and 2015, raising inflation to 5% year-on-year, 1 pp above the upper bound of the 
monetary policy target range (target of 3%, with a tolerance margin of +/- 1 pp). This 
behaviour led to a slight increase in the official interest rate at end-2015, against a 
background in which the signs coming from activity augured a sharp deceleration and a 
negative output gap. 
SOURCES: Datastream and Banco de España.
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To analyse the impact of supply, demand, exchange rate and monetary policy shocks 
on the main Chilean macroeconomic variables, we used a structural BVAR model11, the 
main results of which are set out in Chart 12. As can be seen, the adverse performance 
of domestic demand has led to a decrease in inflation in recent years, an effect masked 
between 2014 and 2016 by the impact of exchange rate depreciation on inflation. Once 
the exchange rate was stabilised, the decrease in inflation became apparent. In recent 
quarters, in response to the weak demand and exchange rate appreciation, inflation 
fell rapidly and has stood at a level below the central bank target since November. This 
led to a monetary policy response in the form of three cuts in the intervention rate, 
each of 25 bp, in January, March and April, reducing it to 2.75%. Activity reflected both 
shocks, as seen in Chart 12, and the lower structural growth of the economy, estimated 
at near 3%. 
In the coming months, the main risk for monetary policy lies in the possibility that, in a 
setting of a stable or slightly appreciating exchange rate, inflation will stand below the 
target for a long period of time. In this respect, the aforementioned model was used to 
simulate a scenario consistent with a central bank monetary policy rate holding steady 
until end-2017, compatible with that expected by the analysts consulted in the March 
2017 economic expectations survey. As a counterfactual scenario, we simulated one in 
which the central bank held its interest rate at the end-2016 level, namely 3.5%. Chart 12 
shows that in the first scenario the monetary stimulus helps to keep inflation above the 3% 
target at end-2017, while in the counterfactual scenario inflation does not return to the 
target until 2018. The size of the impact of monetary policy on inflation is similar to that 
found in other studies for the Chilean economy, such as that of Parrado (2001).12 In short, 
monetary policy would be decisive for stabilising inflation in a situation in which price 
growth departs from the central bank target.
The growth outlook for 2017 is for rates similar to those of 2016. Activity will be weaker in 
the first half of the year due to the carryover effect of the unfavourable performance in 
2016 and to the impact of the mining sector strikes on exports. As these factors fade away, 
a recovery is expected late in the year which will allow the year to end with a growth rate 
close to 2% (the consensus forecast is 1.8%). For 2018, the commencement of a new 
stage following the presidential elections at year-end may bring improved confidence with 
a positive impact on the economic situation.
Turning to risks, it should be noted that the foreign currency indebtedness of private 
agents rose following the 2008-2009 crisis, fuelled by the lax financial conditions at 
international level, increasing their exposure to the balance sheet affects derived from the 
economic slowdown and the currency depreciation. However, the financial markets have 
performed favourably in recent months and corporate balance sheets reflect the prevalence 
of stable long-term sources of funds. This situation could change if financing conditions 
tighten for the Latin American economies (see preceding section). Similarly, fiscal accounts 
may deteriorate if the copper price, which recovered in 2016, falls again. Although the 
11  The model, estimated using quarterly data, includes four endogenous variables (bilateral nominal exchange rate 
against the dollar, inflation rate, GDP and official interest rate) and two exogenous variables (external demand 
and copper price). The model includes a mean-adjustment to reflect the weaker long-term growth outlook 
explained in this section. The shocks to the endogenous variables are identified by a system of sign restrictions; 
see Forbes, K., Hjortsoe, I. and Nenova, T. (2015). “The shocks matter: improving our estimates of exchange 
rate pass-through”. Bank of England External MPC unit Discussion Paper No. 43.
12  Parrado, E. (2001), “Shocks Externos y Transmisión de la Política Monetaria en Chile” Economía Chilena 
4(3) 29-57
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increase in structural expenditure in recent years has coincided with an increase in revenue 
from the fiscal reform approved in 2014, a worsening of the fiscal accounts or failure to 
meet the structural goals set in the fiscal rules could cause market tension and a 
deterioration of financing conditions.
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